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Re: (TFT) Jobs table: 100,000 simulated soldiers and farmers



yes, this is a historical example that would be repeated again in WWII. However, no offense, but it is pretty much irrelevant to a fantasy RPG. Still, as a history buff, I enjoyed it.

If you want to plumb the depths of "change" in an ancient / medieval setting, which is much more like the typical fantasy world, look at something like the change in weapons, armor and tactics between the major protagonists of the 100 Years War. Over about 114 years, there was change, but it happened in miniscule amounts compared to today. The French eventually learned to dismount and attack on foot v. English longbowmen in a superior defensive position. Both sides even occasionally used reserves. Everyone got better and "la petite guerre", the little combats that occurred constantly between foraging parties, etc.

Essentially, a master swordmaker if he lived to work for 25 years, might do nothing except learn his craft better. If he was truly a genius and pushed a little, he might make a couple of improvements that are too small for modern people to notice, but a contemporary might immediately.

-----Original Message----- From: Jay Carlisle
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 7:02 PM
To: tft@brainiac.com
Subject: Re: (TFT) Jobs table: 100,000 simulated soldiers and farmers

Okay todays diatribe is going to look at a couple of the concepts Ive been
harping on for awhile, namely the idea of limits and change in a campaign.

Some campaigns are framed in such a way that these issues are not pertinent
to play while a great many others ignore the ideas while still allowing
aspects of play like new spell research.
In discussions with other gamers about this Ive found that the general
feeling seems to be that these concepts are too long term in duration and
much too abstract to have much of a place in a game thats trying to move
players along from one encounter to the next.
As one player put it, that stuff is just a distraction.
When pressed on these opinions the problem appears to be that many players
feel that placing limits on things like raw materials or aspects of change
like technological development are simply too complex to fit into a RPG
campaign.
Viewed from the dungeon crawl approach this is understandable, most dungeon
crawls dont even deal with healing, except through spells and potions, much
less other more abstract ideas of downtime.
I believe this was mentioned in the recent Death Test discussion.
Fair enough, but if the GM is calling his game a campaign there is the
assumption of time passing, even between crawls, and the idea of a series of
dungeon crawls occurring over the course of a year or two doesnt seem to be
anathema to most players.
So now that Ive setup my straw man lets knock him down.

The u.s. entered the Great War (WWI) in April 1917.
Versailles was signed in June 1918.
Just prior to her entry the newly formed National Advisory Committee on
Aeronautics had conducted a study of the 2 u.s. air fields and 55
serviceable airplanes then in inventory finding 51 of those planes to be
obsolete and the other 4 obsolescent.
Immediately the allied forces in Europe requested 5000 aviators to France by
the start of 1918 to maintain air superiority, sending instructors and
details of aviation advancements that had been closely guarded while the
u.s. remained neutral.
To attempt this required three primary requisites; aviators, training
planes, and service planes.

On entry the u.s. air service was a small, struggling organization that was
unpopular in the chain of command.
Aviation was limited to unmarried officers under 30 and the opposition from
many of the higher-ups offered no assured future.
This resulted in a total personnel, flying and non-flying, of fewer than
1,200 men at the onset.
The result of this shortage of manpower combined with the opening of new
fields meant that the vast majority of the early graduating classes had to
be retained as instructors.
Still, by the date of the armistice there were 27 airfields in operation
with well over 1000 instructors.
8,602 men had graduated elementary training (mechanics, signaling, ground
gunnery, and first solo)
4,028 men had completed advanced training (all around training for bombing,
observation, and escort on several different planes)
6,528 men were still in training (59% elementary 41% advanced)
Over 5000 pilots had been sent overseas with 2,226 still in final training
(specific job and equipment) and 1,238 on duty when all went quiet on the
western front.
Yes thats only 3,464 men and I said over 5000 were sent this was a war you
know.
The total personnel in the Air Service at the armistice was nearly 200,000
men.
As Ron White puts it, I dont know how many it would have taken to kick my
ass, but I know how many they were gonna use.

With 5000 aviators on demand and only 55 training planes on hand the
production of training planes was the issue of greatest immediate concern in
April 1917.
As a result of the NACA study a small number of planes were already on order
and other orders were rapidly placed.
Deliveries of primary trainers started in June 1917 and had reached 5,300 by
the close including 1,600 which were abandoned on account of an
unsatisfactory engine design.
An additional 2,500 advanced trainers were produced with additional planes
purchased from the allies totaling just over 9,500 trainers by the wars end.

As soon as war was declared it became possible for american officers and
engineers to access allied air technology.
A commission was sent abroad (adventure) to select types of foreign service
planes for production in the united states.
The controlling factor was engines.
As u.s. factories could not be retooled quickly enough for European motor
production and foreign production was insufficient to meet even current
demand coupled with the rapidity with which the designs of the planes were
changing american production focused on larger and more stable observation
and bombing craft, leaving the production of escort and pursuit planes to
the European factories.
Even with these bigger and steadier aircraft only estimates could be made as
to their adaptability to the u.s. engines.
4 types were chosen; the De Havilland-4 (British observation and day
bomber), the Handley-Page (British night bomber), the Caproni (Italian night
bomber), and the Bristol (British 2 seat fighter)
The De Havilland redesign resulted in reduced visibility and the larger fuel
tank increased the danger of explosion in a crash but the increased speed
and maneuvering ability more than compensated and the american De Havilland
was often acknowledged to be the fastest bombing and observation planes on
the front at wars end with a production rate of over 1,100 per month and a
total of 3,227 completed of which 1,885 in France and 667 at the zone of
advance.
Of the other three designs the Handley-Page had been tested and the parts
for 100 planes had arrived in Europe for assembly while a delay in receipt
of schematics delayed the Caproni to the point that the redesign had just
completed testing at the time of the armistice and the Bristol was a failure
due to the increased weight necessary to accommodate the u.s. engine.
The chief u.s. motor was the Liberty 12-cylinder which had gone through
design and testing and had reached a production level approaching 4000 a
month by October 1918.
13,574 were produced in total with 4,435 delivered to the AEF and an
additional 1,025 delivered to the British, French, and Italian air services
by the wars close.
Several other engine types were in various stages of development with the
Hispano-Suiza 180 horsepower having reached quantity production with 469
produced and about half shipped for use in foreign-built pursuit planes.
Up to the end of November, 1918, the total number of service engines secured
was in excess of 22,000.
Of this number more than 16,000, or 73%, were from american sources and less
than 6000 from foreign sources.

Airplane production on this scale threatened to exhaust the supply of a
number of materials, chiefly spruce, fir, and mahogany wood, castor oil,
linen, and material for dopes.
In order to meet the spruce and fir shortages labor battalions were
organized and sent west.
However, the increase in harvested board feet was only half the battle,
improved kiln process also had to be developed to season the lumber rapidly
without loss of strength or resiliency.
These methods solved the problem with almost 175 million feet of spruce and
fir delivered, of which more than two thirds went to the allies.
Mahogany for propellers was partially replaced with walnut, cherry, oak, and
ash.
The improved seasoning methods secured excellent results with these other
woods.
Castor oil was at first the only satisfactory lubricant for airplane motors.
To meet the shortages castor bean acreage was greatly increased and a
mineral oil substitute was developed.
The acute linen shortage was met with the development of a long fiber cotton
substitute that proved superior to linen.
The dopeing materials used by the allies was in limited supply and highly
inflammable (Hindenburg).
The american substitute was made from more plentiful basic materials and was
far less inflammable.

Innovations in these main areas allowed the u.s. to field 45 frontline
squadrons by the wars end destroying 755 enemy planes to their own losses of
357 aircraft.

All that in a year and a half and thats just the air service.
Im just pointing out that pertinent change can and does occur quickly
sometimes, especially in war.
It all depends on how you frame it.
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